

## C.D.E.F



The aim is the capability of the forces to execute missions of various natures that are assigned to them in order to reach the searched final political objective; the military operation line must, in this sense, converge with the other lines of operations, diplomatic, economic, security, humanitarian, etc.

The aim is clear. The means are also clear: men, equipment and doctrines whose appropriate adequacy is the first condition of the effectiveness of the tool they build together. The second condition of this indispensable efficiency is training whose quality is, on its part, determined by the available resources - human, finance and time - that can be dedicated to this purpose.

This is where simulation finds all its interest. The requirement of optimizing resources whilst searching for training conditions close to reality gives all its meaning and all its interest to technical tools enabling to reproduce at best the environment of the military technical act, whatever its level might be, ranging from the elementary implementation of equipment to the command and control of an army corps.

In order to be successful, simulation assets must however fulfill several fundamental conditions. Failing that, they will not be truly adopted by their users and, finally, they will gradually fall in the operational oblivion despite their high development costs.

The *first condition* is that of “legitimacy”. It consists, as far as simulation is concerned, in corresponding as closely as possible to the reality that is met or can be met by the users. This is a requirement: a simulation - especially one that enables the training of staffs - which would only reproduce roughly the new engagement conditions would be very quickly, for lack of interest, rejected by its users. There lies an evolution axis that present and future systems will have to strictly follow in order to be in sync with new conflicts, considering firstly the importance of populations, then that of built-up areas and lastly of new players. This “legitimacy” requirement has indeed two direct consequences, one concerns the adaptation capability - as the engagement circumstances are changing

faster and faster and simulation must closely follow these evolutions - and the other one pertains to the direct use capability for the operational preparation of units before they are projected, so it must be able to reproduce the real conditions of operations.

The *second* condition is reliability; the inevitably short training periods using simulation must not be regularly disrupted by operation incidents that discredit them.

The *third* one is simplicity, which enables the users to rapidly take over the tools that are made available to them whilst avoiding long and costly apprehension periods and, gradually, work remotely if needed without having to organize complicated and costly regroupings of personnel and equipment.

Firstly considered as a technological assistance available to the soldier for training and instruction, simulation - possibly coupled with operational research whose virtues one rightly rediscovers today - can also constitute a useful aid in defining doctrine and in the decision-making process. Although we are still in the first stages of infancy in this domain, it is advisable to pursue along a track that seems promising... provided that we know how to preserve for man the place he deserves, i.e. the essential place.

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