

C.D.E.F



As decided by the Army COS, the CDEF (Doctrine and Forces Employment Center) is replacing the former CDES on July 2004.

Reporting directly to general THORETTE and taking advantage of its four divisions - Employment & Organization of forces, Studies & Lessons learnt, Operational Research & Simulation, Support & Documentation - that Doctrine Center is aiming at three goals :

- to be the "nervous center" for the operational preparation of Forces,
- to take part in the development of arguments enabling deciders to define budgetary choices concerning the resources allocated to land forces,
- to be the driving force in developing military tactical and operational thinking for the land component.

It is in this very spirit that Doctrine issue Nr 3, the first issue released under the aegis of the new CDEF, comes up, on the one hand, in total continuity with the former CDES when handling important issues - today a very essential one, MOUT (Military Operation on Urban Terrain) - the ones we will have to carry out tomorrow morning - thus completing the previous special issue about Intifada and his lessons learnt ; and, on the other hand, by establishing the foundations of future doctrinal evolution as developed in the paper written by the general, director of the doctrine center, and prefiguring the framework and the principles that could preside the employment of forces.

In fact, we are at the very moment when budgetary choices and geo-political, strategic and tactical evolutions are superimposing one over the other thus inciting to think about some defense and security models, especially for a Europe in progress. In addition, the importance of lessons learnt since over fifteen years on all theaters essential for Europe is sufficient to throw light on the concrete tracks of the evolution of our land forces through practice and obvious range of facts.

Are these lessons sufficient to answer our many questions, do they allow to question some certainties still largely shared and perhaps already relevant ?

For example, should we absolutely differentiate high and low intensity warfare, do we have to seriously envisage a concept like the "first in, first out" one, is it "operationally useful" to categorize our forces according to the weight of their vehicles and armament ?

Definitely, this is the type of approach that we should never cease to undertake, supplemented and clarified by the answers given to the four questions which set up the doctrinal corpus and the principles of the operational preparation of our forces :

- which type of enemies or opponents ?
- which kind of commitment scenarios ?
- which kinds of equipment ?
- for which type of units and which staff organization ?

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