Bruno Le Maire, former chief of staff of the French Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin and deputy in the Eure department¹, presented the result of his experience, his assessment of the role of state as well as the decision process to respond to a crisis, especially the one caused by avian flu in 2005 and 2006².

1 . Three statements stand out right away: the increase in the number of threats, the population's high expectations from the State, and the response to the crisis, as soon as it is identified, at the highest level.

First of all, the increase in the number of new threats, clearly identified in the White Paper, has to be taken into consideration: terrorism, natural disasters, more frequent and violent; epidemiological risk, etc.

Then we must reckon the requirements of our compatriots regarding protection against a disaster, whatever its extent or nature is (terrorist, epidemiological, sanitary or natural). Actually, they expect from the authorities both the guarantee of a minimum risk, even

non-existent and a total and immediate protection in the event of a crisis. All the lessons learned confirm it. In this respect, Bruno Le Maire mentions the case of Sharm El-Sheikh air disaster causing the death of 110 French nationals. Confronted to tragic situations or a crisis, our compatriots require the authorities to take steps and get results, a challenge which is often difficult to take up. Only an efficient system in response to the crisis can face up to it.

Finally, the new threats are less perceptible and tangible than before. It is obvious that the avian flu virus is less easy to detect than the nuclear threat coming from the Eastern Bloc. Therefore the difficulty consists in getting a fix on the reality of the threat and assessing the consequences in a very uncertain context. The chikungunya crisis in Reunion Island can be taken as an example: was it a simple incident in front of which involved people overreacted? Or was it instead a "true" crisis requiring the setting up of immediate and very important means. In an uncertain world that often depends on technical considerations or divergent assessments, political leaders have to address a major issue: they have to make a realistic assessment of whether a crisis is occurring or not and to determine the appropriate response.

2.  Avian flu crisis management: a textbook case for alert, immediate reaction and lessons learned

The Alert :

Once the crisis has been identified, initial arrangements have to be taken. Therefore it is necessary that political authorities be alerted through an effective warning system, like the one used in our country. Because only the political authority is legitimately entitled to make the obvious decision, at local or national level, an adequate warning system consists in a system through which the political authority is warned within minutes following the triggering of the crisis or the realization of a threat. As far as the avian flu is concerned, the political authorities were informed at the right time and at the appropriate level; moreover, the seriousness of the threat could be clearly identified.

The immediate reaction capability :

First of all, the authority that is entitled to act has to be identified (prefect? commander of the military zone? ; departments of the Ministry of Health or Ministry of the Interior?) as well as the one in charge of the crisis management.

Then a response to the crisis has to be defined, depending upon the means that are available or that can be made ready for use. With respect to avian flu and for lack of sufficient anticipation, means that were immediately available to the population would have been insufficient (anti-retroviral drugs, vaccines, protection masks, etc.), should the whole national territory be affected by the crisis³. The possibility of an avian flu crisis affecting France on a large scale had not been seriously considered.

Finally the conceivable duration of the reaction has to be taken into account. Once specific measures have been set up (passing through foot bath, vaccine doses at infected places) how long should the plan be maintained? Because, from the moment that threat has been reduced and in order to put an end to the protection plan, a political responsibility has to be taken, without being completely sure that risk doesn't exist anymore.

Lessons learned :

Experience drawn from the first episode of avian flu in France was eventful and conducted in a pragmatic way.

Without any doubt, the first lesson shows that threat of avian flu remains as strong in 2008 as it could have been in 2006 or 2007. The risk of virus transmission from man to man remains. Besides, it is noticeable that the number of deaths is still high, even slightly higher in 2008 than it was in 2006 and 2007, especially in Asia .

The second lesson concerns the financial area: only for health expenditure regarding the avian flu, the budget for prevention of health crises amounts to more than 800 million euros per year. Thus France grants an important amount dedicated to the only management of vaccine stock reordering or to the building up of necessary mass stocks that would be made available, should an avian flu outbreak occur.

The third lesson learned from the avian flu crisis is related to the general organization of the fight against the threat, now clarified. However, the need to answer some issues and to define the distribution of responsibilities among civilians and military actors will probably remain.

3 . Main lessons learned from crises in France

At government level, crises management on the national territory highlights a real French know-how on the subject. The military play a crucial part in this process. As for the European coordination, it will have to be developed.

With regard to crisis management, a true French expertise is available. The French territory has not been spared by hardships (terrorism, health issues, etc.) and the lessons learned were followed by measures. Indeed, the system is not perfect yet, but it is most likely one of those that are in best position to face up to the crises.

Each crisis commands to reconsider everyone's part, and especially the task of the armed forces within the French administrative organization; it is necessary since the military will end up having a very visible part to play. This role will eagerly be awaited by the French.

The worst the crisis is, the more the French expect the use of last resort means, i.e. the armed forces.

Finally, if there is a true European coordination, as far as crisis management is concerned, it has to be constantly improved. Thanks to a warning process managed by the European Commission, the Union internal crises are taken care of; thanks to a civil-military response within the framework of European security and defense policy, risks are managed everywhere in the world,. The French Presidency of the European Union represents an opportunity to make concrete strides in order to answer our fellow citizens' concern⁴.

¹ In December 2008, Bruno Le Maire was appointed Secretary of State in charge of European Affairs.

² Viral illness, highly contagious, mainly infecting poultry and pet or wild birds. According to an evaluation report issued by the French Institute for Public Health Surveillance in October 2004, such a pandemic could possibly affect 9 to 21 million people and cause from 91 000 to 212 000 deaths.

³ It should be noted that, on January 13, 2006, 58 departments were concerned by concentration measures regarding poultry.

⁴ The French Presidency obtained a whole series of decisions that will allow to strengthen solidarity between the member states, effectiveness and coordination of national assets and preparation of all the key players through common training within the scope of a school network as well as institutes responsible for civil defense and humanitarian action. A concept of European mutual assistance has been adopted to guarantee a better risk coverage. Thus, on a voluntary basis, interoperable and mobilizable pre-identified emergency modules have been made available by the member states. This concept lies within the framework of the European civil defense mechanism. The initiatives, as a whole, will be monitored thanks to a roadmap defining; in most of areas, specific objectives and a timetable to achieve them.