Tactical training of Officers and Non Commissioned Officers (NCOs) is unanimously recognized as a basic requirement. This article offers a thorough and realistic pattern as much as it has been implemented both fully-in a battalion of conscripts-and partially-in a battalion engaged in overseas operations (OPEX). This pattern may be applied as soon as a reasonable quorum is reached: about a third of the theoretical audience. It relies on simply organized exercises not requiring heavy files but forming a coherent whole.
Before going ahead, the commanding officer (CO) must set objectives and in particular the missions to be used as teaching aids (unless decided by a higher authority). Next, he should determine an educational structure; an example is described in this article. Above all, he should set out a training roadmap and stick to it fiercely, if necessary showing the greatest obstinacy in the face of subordinates (functional leaders and company commanders) who may cede to the pressure of impending deadlines and succumb to the temptation of adjournment or abandon.
If he shows unrelenting obstinacy in keeping to the schedule, if he is deeply and personally involved in every activity from the beginning to the end of the program and if he systematically disciplines absentees, then he will succeed in meeting his objectives.  

But which tactics to teach?

Things were simple back in the day (before the fall of the Berlin Wall). We trained for conventional warfare under a nuclear threat. We learned tactics for relatively homogeneous and equal large masses (symmetric war), with units nested one inside the other like Russian dolls: battalion in brigade, in division, in army corps. Both camps were operating and aiming to win through battle.
There a brief “interposition” phase where the key expertise seemed to be the checkpoint and escorting humanitarian convoys. It was rather difficult to apply tactical decision-making process to situations not requiring use of force.
For some years—and it would seem to have been the case for some while—the prevailing paradigm is that of counter-insurrection warfare.

So on which model should tactical training be based? The model “of the moment,” useful immediately but vulnerable to changing trends; or the “conventional” model, which better characterizes classical thinking but may prove to be obsolete?
The question is not anodyne. We have to take into account the effort of the battalion with long careers in mind. The tactical spirit of officers and NCOs develops over two decades, by which time war as we know it may have changed fundamentally.

Firstly, regardless of whether we consider mass warfare or COIN warfare, the battalion would seem to be the key unit. In the masses, it is the basic element of the big unit maneuver. In COIN warfare, it is the level of tactical cohesion. Even in Afghanistan, there is no brigade maneuver. Battalions maneuver and the upper levels are there to coordinate resources.
Then, tautologically, we are in a time of combined arms conflict, if not joint operations. Today’s operations are decentralized down to the lowest levels. If this model of war remains valid, any choice which consolidates the combined arms culture of our officers and NCOs will be vindicated. Of course, were it to change—should “the Great War” paradigm become relevant again—we would no doubt see the various functions refocusing at higher levels, reducing the combined arms aspect of combat at low levels. In this case, the combined arms expertise taught to young officers and NCOs would be truly useful to them as they rise through the ranks.

So, in—partial—conclusion, the tactical training provided in-battalion must be focused on the BnTF and the company TF level with, as much as possible, a combined arms view.

However, the commanding officer (or even the Army Chief of Staff if he chooses to be directive) must  make choices, as there are significant differences between the two models.
In “conventional” war, with its big masses, the maneuver is wider than in counter-insurrectional war. For instance, in the past we studied mobile defense, in which a division covered over a hundred kilometers within 36 hours. Today, our Bn TFs patrol fixed sectors for the duration of their stay.

However, the human density of fighters is far lower today. Combat support, until recently massive and centralized to this end, is now scattered. We no longer fire shells in clusters (96 rounds), but in ones and twos. On the other hand, although fire is used more sparingly, it is much more discriminating. The concept of tactical decision has become much more blurred and it is almost impossible to pick a winner at the end of a three-day search.
Some “conventional” missions may seem obsolete—for example screening, mobile defense, positional defense and denial action—but some of their processes are easily transferrable to the present context.
The missions that are clearly still relevant have been listed in the inventory for quite some time—for example: control an area, set an ambush, react to an incident, reduce an isolated resistance and cover—and a more recent list could be compiled: cordon off a zone, search, etc.

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Perhaps it is possible to study tactics without studying specific missions per se. It is not, however, possible to implement tactics without choosing a ground, an opponent and a mission. The choice of a mission as a basis for tactical exercises is therefore a crucial one, unless it is possible to study the full range of missions.

In any case, however operations develop, anything which stimulates the minds of our commanders is beneficial, if not the optimum solution.

The tactical training of leaders does not aim to cover the full range of missions, even if it is based on this. It aims to prepare the most safe, quick and clear tactical decision-making possible. It aims to develop initiative, aggression (literally speaking: to have a biting wit), a penchant for risk and perceptiveness—particularly in the management of combat support—without ever forgetting the ethical judgment that must underpin every tactical choice.

Fundamentally, any tactical exercise—be it related to procedures or direct implementation—has a goal that is both internal (to develop the skills of the cell) and external (to develop the ability to operate between two tactical levels).
When possible, the proposed framework includes two—or even three—tactical levels by principle. In addition, it recommends upper-level and out-of-specialty training.
Upper-level training entails involving the subordinate level with the level above, so as to give a better understanding of the working environment. For instance, the lieutenant is involved with his captain’s thinking. Experience shows that this practice is very popular with subordinates.
The out-of-specialty concept is based on the notion that everyone must be open-minded and not focus solely on his own needs. To achieve this, the exercises aim at crossing specialties. Tactical leaders must get used to the rationale of their logistic counterparts, and vice-versa. While not giving them all the required expertise, a minimum of knowledge regarding the other field of action is worth having in its own right.
It is not guaranteed that this will influence overall performance. But it can’t do any harm. Once again, experience has shown it to be a powerful incentive factor once everyone has grasped the general idea.

And how should we organize ourselves?

I have used this pattern twice at battalion level, first as a S3 in a battalion of conscripts and then as commanding officer of a professional battalion. This pattern is an ambitious one, but it has already been applied, both fully (with the 3rd Dragons Regiment) and partially (with the 1st Foreign Cavalry Regiment). In the current context, it may be seen as “ideal,” but, like every ideal, impossible to each yet useful to aim at.
It is very structured, both in the definition of the audiences and the typology of the exercises. This formal aspect facilitates both planning and implementation, which constitutes a considerable advantage in current times. In particular, once an iteration has been run for a given exercise, there is no longer any need to start the session with an explanation of each participant’s role, saving time for all.

The framework includes many and varied types of exercises suited to specific audiences, split into “Levels” which are well-known in battalions.

LEVEL A = battalion headquarters, in the widest sense: this encompasses all officers, non commissioned officers and other personnel likely to work in the Bn TF CP.
In addition to the battalion headquarters proper, it is important to remember the Signals platoon, the HQ platoon and the battalion protection platoon.
To come back to the battalion headquarters, it is important to consider that not only all S3 section officers but also the quartermaster and his assistant, the surgeon and liaison officers participate.

LEVEL B = company commanders, once again, to be taken in a wide sense: current and future company commanders (including their executive officers), and also their own environment (logistics officer, company sergeant major, Signals troops, etc.).

LEVEL C = Platoon/troop leaders of any kind (therefore the leader of the maintenance shop, the nursing officer, the soldiers’ catering platoon, etc.) and future leaders (in practice, all BSTAT¹ candidates).

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Exercises involving both levels A and B are named ASTERIX²
Those intended more specifically for levels B and C are named OBELIX (the bulk of the force). Level A is involved with them to provide guidance.

A specific OBELIX—logistics—is described under a particular framework, “the logistics yoyo.” From it stems a Forward Combat Trains (TC1) drill exercise called LOGISTIX.

The derivative exercises for commanding captains (Level B) are named CENTURION.

They can in turn form the basis of platoon leader level exercises: IDEFIX.

A specific training structure intended for level C (troop/platoon leaders) but supervised by level B (the company commanders), deals with major contemporary issues (PANORAMIX) and military history (CLAUSEWIX).

ASTERIX exercises

ASTERIX exercises form a series, based on a central theme which evolves from one exercise to the next. It is recommended to select an area close to the barracks, enabling reconnaissance on the ground if necessary. The single, evolving theme offers the advantage of not requiring a new and complete exercise file for each session, as the former rehearsal level is used as a starting point for the on-going iteration. This continuity is popular and avoids the artificial aspect of a complete file to be learned prior to every exercise. In this situation, the experience of those who have taken part in the previous exercise is directly used in the on-going exercise, which is actually quite close to the operational reality.

The following series was applied with the 3rd RD (Stetten) in 1995-1996, at the rate of one D+N+D approximately every six weeks. The context was “conventional.”

ASTERIX 1

• CP presentation: deployment, organization
• Battalion Task Force MDMP: theoretical presentation
• Implementation in a simple practical scenario: the Bn TF is moving alone through an unsafe area
• Outcomes: warning order, initial order, annexes (movements?), briefings
• Level B: Taking part as CP staff (up-level), then downgrading to their level (cascaded orders) and back briefing
• Environment: HQ support platoon, signal platoon drill (SCDG, SITREP)

ASTERIX 2

• Starting from the previous situation: procedural reminders (putting newcomers are up to speed)
  
• Concrete scenario: change to the previous situation. The movement studied in the previous exercise is interrupted to face an unexpected threat (hence new task organization, change in direction, etc.)
• Outcomes: warning orders, fragmentary orders
• Level B and environment: same as previous scenario

ASTERIX 3

• Specific complex scenario regarding coordination (relief on a position)
• Outcomes: same orders

ASTERIX 4

Fragmentary orders (in this case, position defense on a gap)
Analysis of variants (counterattacks).

OBELIX exercises

The following series was applied with the 3rd RD (Stetten) in 1995-1996, at the rate of one Friday approximately every 6 weeks. The context was “conventional.” The S3 organized the first two iterations directly, giving the company commanders time to prepare their missions. Themes were distributed in cooperation with the company commanders.

OBELIX 1

• Battalion Task Force presentation
• Brigade presentation
• Theme of the afternoon:
  Group 1 Movement of the brigade
  Group 2 Stationing of the brigade

OBELIX 2

• The exercise enemy
• Theme of the afternoon
  Group 1 The defending MRR
  Group 2 The attacking TR

OBELIX 3

• The Bn TF logistics
  HHC commander the chains:
• Medical, supply, maintenance, troop support
• Deployment and change of location of Rear Combat Trains (TC 2)
  
• Afternoon “The logistic yoyo” (see details below)

OBELIX 4

• The Bn TF action in MOUT
  Co commander
• Theme of the afternoon    
  Group 1 The Bn TF in a protracted stationing
  Group 2 The attacking Bn TF

OBELIX 5

• Tactical deception
  Co commander
• Afternoon theme                
  Group 1 How to simulate a stationing Bn TF
  Group 2 How to fake an attack

OBELIX 6

• Counter-reconnaissance
  Co commander    
• Afternoon theme                
  Group 1 Bn TF carries out counter-reconnaissance  actions
  Group 2 Eny recce tries to gain contact with the Bn TF

OBELIX 7

• The enemy levels 2 and 3 CS & CSS Co
  Commander
• Afternoon theme                               
  Group 1 The Bn TF moving face to a Level 2 eny
  Group 2 The Bn TF stationing face to a Level 2 eny

OBELIX 8

• Lessons learned from a company commander returning from an overseas operation (IFOR)

Specific scenario: OBELIX LOGISTICS

It is necessary to be very directive regarding this exercise, and experience shows it to be the most appreciated of all, particularly among junior officers and NCOs as it is the closest to the field.
It must take place in September or October, as it is directly useful for all players, particularly those preparing for exams such as the Army NCOs specialized course (BSTAT).

The HHC company commander and the S4 as well as the quartermaster and surgeon are closely involved.

The morning briefings are distributed between the admin and technical officer and the HQ and logistics company commander. The issues to be addressed are as follows:

1. the general principles of logistics
2. the Bn TF under the logistic perspective (personnel strength, vehicles fleet, replenishment requirements, etc.)
3. the various chains: Medical, supply, maintenance, troop support from the logistics support group down to the consumer
4. the deployment of the battalion and company combat trains
5. the change of location of the battalion combat train

The afternoon is devoted to a kind of “logistic yoyo.”
Attendees must circulate through all the chains, from the logistics support group down to the company combat train.

A Forward Combat Train (TC1) is deployed somewhere in the facilities, with at least one of each type of vehicle likely to be fielded: maintenance-type P4, light intervention element, medical VAB, support truck.

On the parade ground (or elsewhere) the battalion combat train (TC2) is deployed in clearly differentiated points:

1. medical point with a battalion aid station
2. maintenance point with hoisting and supply means
3. forward arming and refueling point with all possible versions (fuel, ammunition) with required hoisting means
4. command point with the battalion combat train VAB
5. prisoner point.

Taking advantage of local resources, a logistics support group is set up, or a functional equivalent relying on the existing infrastructure:

1. infirmary for triage
2. workshops for the maintenance area
3. gas station for the fuel area
4. ad hoc location for the ammunition area
5. same thing for soldier support (handling the dead and monitoring of treated people).

The different briefers prepare a 5-minute talk about what happens in their zones.

To leave lasting memories, all attendees back and forth between chains, from the rear to the front and vice versa. They carry devices which promote “awareness.”

LOGISTIX exercise

This exercise is as a supplement to the OBELIX logistics exercise and proposes a centralized company combat train drill. It is the only way to provide company logistic deputies with practical experience of real command, particularly in the current context of the inventory maintenance and management policy (PEGP).
A complete company combat train is set up, gathered for the day. The day before, the company first sergeants and/or the company logistic officers are gathered for a theory refresher and a briefing on the exercise (simplified theme).
The exercise consists of a circuit loop, possibly repeated, where each player will have to command the Forward Combat Train for a leap. Each player must:

1. take into account the mission (to move with the Forward Combat Train from one place to another)
2. plan the movement
3. give orders
4. execute the movement
5. deploy the Forward Combat Train at its new position, in an unsafe area and taking into account the tactical situation of the company
6. give orders for a mission (send the medical VAB or the armored recovery tank to a company)
7. respond to an unexpected incident (artillery shelling with injured people, appearance of lost enemy personnel, to be captured then managed).

While a player plays his phase, his successor prepares the next. On order, he takes into account the Forward Combat Trains, gives it orders and executes the movement. This continues until all players have commanded “their” company for two or three hours while performing a leap.

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CENTURION exercises

One CENTURION exercise for each type of mission: ATTACK (COUNTER-ATTACK), BLOCK, DELAY, RAID, etc.

The S3 issues an operations order with three or four very different tasks for subordinates. The theme must be local so the captains can carry out reconnaissance in the field.
The captains play each role in turn. This saves on themes.
For example: the Bn TF is preparing an attack. A company team carries out a reconnaissance and a counter-reconnaissance in the zone of approach. A second company is in reserve, facing two enemy forces engagement scenarios. A third is gaining ground to cover the main action in the enemy depth. The fourth covers a secondary direction.

Each captain has two hours to plan his mission and must express it as an operation order to the S3 and his classmates (who play the company leaders).
After the exercise, each participant writes his complete operation order with an overlay.

This exercise, which is similar to a Command and General Staff College oral test, improves performance but also gives the habit of a command dialogue. It may be complicated at every possible opportunity, for example  playing it against the clock within the VAB or at night.

The IDEFIX exercises

One IDEFIX exercise for each type of mission: ATTACK (COUNTER-ATTACK), BLOCK, DELAY, RAID, etc.

The company commander starts from one of his orders from CENTURION.

Each platoon leader has two hours to plan his maneuver and explain it through an operational order to the company commander and his classmates (who play the role of platoon leader).
After the exercise, each participant writes his complete operation order with an overlay.
Writing a complete operation order enables us to turn this into a tactical exercise on the ground for leaders at platoon level.

The two following exercises, PANORAMIX and CLAUSEWIX, are more didactic briefings than tactical exercises. However, they help develop the tactical and general knowledge of officers and NCOs and thus have their place in this inventory.
They are combined in a half-day of leader training. They could form part of the information day during which the commanding officer or functional leaders will use to develop organic points.
It may be advisable to share the world regions among companies, thus encouraging them to specialize.

2 Translator’s note: Astérix the Gaul is a character from a popular French comic book.