Proceeding with its new doctrinal approach, the French Army has just issued a second document dealing with general tactics (FT 02, ? Tactique générale ? ), in which are specified the practical details of actions. Their purposes have been defined in the preceding publication (FT 01). This handbook is intended to remind the reader of the actual features of current land commitments in all their sharp aspects. The duration of conflicts and crises, the scattering of operation theaters all over the world, the variety in types of operations and in circumstances, the increasing toughening of war-fighting and the de-structuring of units evidence both factors of continuity and of radical change. Continuity relates to the irregular wars of the past, in which land operations prevailed, as well as the predominance and duration of stability and counter guerilla operations. Radical changes are linked to changes affecting society, to strong tensions over the cost of operations, to limitations on strength and equipment, to the impact of mediacoverage immediacy and the shorter time left for decision making. While the environment is changing, the hard facts of war are still there.

The following elements of general tactics are intended to be an answer, even if it is probably provisional, for the requirements of today's and tomorrow's conflicts. This document recalls their unchangeable principles, and specifies the new principles now prevailing so as to respond successfully to the whole spectrum of engagements. These range from the "great war" to the "irregular" and asymmetric wars with which our forces are confronted after a short intermission. The lessons learned from our past colonial history, from Galliéni to Lyautey, the revitalization and fresh approach to Trinquier's and Galula's texts, which for a long time have been a subject of study in American military academies and units, should enable us to understand better how to act efficiently among local populace, since it is among them that our land forces are committed today. The religious factor has superseded the nationalist and political ideologies of post-colonial wars. However, "the native, at the heart of the conflict, is still the centre of gravity" . In an atmosphere of insecurity, the point is still to manage the complexity of a situation, to try to dispel the "fog of war" , to reinforce and maintain the cohesion bonds among own troops, as well as make these bonds looser among opponents. The insubstantial, psychological element is resuming prevalence as the delusion of conflict resolution through purely technological means is fading away. As for the military commander, the point is to include his action into a comprehensive maneuver which comprises physical as well as insubstantial areas. Psychological operations, direct and indirect approaches complementing each other, situation awareness, monitoring of opponent's lines of operation, intelligence collection, and wise employment of reserved forces as well as a legitimate use of force are new - or renewed - proceedings which our staffs are now including within their concepts and operation maneuvers. Our area control operations of fifty years ago, as well as officers from the "Affaires Indigènes" ², are re-acquiring sharp relevance.
The conservation of balance, reversibility and responsive tailoring are crucial requirements that our forces must comply with.
The conservation of balance should be ensured on the one hand in the management of capabilities to retain so as to respond to any situation, and, on the other hand, in the management of the units operational cycle so as to enable troops to train and enjoy family life in the interval between two deployments.

Reversibility: a satisfactory balance should be achieved between preparation for an improbable but always possible war and preparation for a real but always limited war; tactical reversibility of units which suffer losses in crowd control operations and nevertheless patrol in the same districts the next day, wearing only berets.

Tailoring: lessons learned from Afghanistan , Africa and the Balkans bring us back to the hard facts. For our troops, the responsive tailoring of doctrine, structures, equipment and operational readiness, is a lifeand-death issue. Subjected to constant transformation, land forces are setting up new units for intelligence, CIMIC and psychological information. Against mines, explosive devices threatening our convoys, against snipers, the protection of dismounted combatants, riflemen and vehicles is improving, thus demonstrating the importance of small-scale programs of operational consistency. Deployed assets are no longer restrained. Tanks and artillery protect our isolated posts. Their deterrent presence takes part in stabilization.
Last, tailoring also occurs in the field of operational readiness. After years of «peacekeeping» activities, our forces are being committed in tough, demanding, and even murderous conflicts. The sacred links which bring together commanders and troops facing death have assumed fresh relevance. Physical and psychological victory and even survival depend on compliance with simple principles such as discipline, training, or cohesion. Operational readiness relies on the learning of basics both at individual and collective levels (hardness, marksmanship, first aid), on achievement of individual and collective tactical skills which should even become instinctive, on combined arms and joint training (close air support), and eventually, on operational readiness before deployment. Our units are trained, united, motivated, and so are ready to fight, to strike. Educated and fully aware of the meaning of their mission, they have also been trained (this is true even of privates) to show understanding and situation awareness. We should fully realize that our small units must be the subject of our care, and that battalions are the crucibles of a necessary human cohesion which receives and nurtures significance. Sweat always spares blood.

All things considered, this tactics handbook is definitely the inheritor of the French tradition of pragmatic doctrinal research. Fully taking account of forces' requirements, this document should enable forces to fully comprehend the complexity of current and future engagements, to understand how to defeat the enemy on open terrain as well as among populace. When all is said, wars will always be clashes between two wills, but force is not enough. It provides the conditions necessary for restoring peace, and more than ever in the past it operates within a comprehensive maneuver which requires political guidance and strong interagency coordination. To disregard this approach will entail deadlock and defeat. History, as well as current events, reminds us of that regularly, and at our expense.

"Tactique générale" is not intended to be a final handbook, because the face of war, and therefore the conditions of employment of our land forces are changing permanently. Fortunately, there will be new editions of it, enriched with lessons learned from our operations. The prime quality of tactics, like that of all armed forces for that matter, is to know how to adapt to circumstances.

[1] : This article covers the main features of the preface to the FT 02 handbook drafted by Lieutenant General Lecerf.

[2] : Indigenous Affairs